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Abstract
Although both economists and psychologists seek to identify determinants of hetero-
geneity in behavior, they use different concepts to capture them. In this review we
first analyze the extent to which economic preferences and psychological concepts of
personality - such as the Big Five and locus of control - are related. We analyze data
from incentivized laboratory experiments and representative samples and find only
low degrees of association between economic preferences and personality. We then
regress life outcomes - such as labor market success, health status and life satisfaction
- simultaneously on preference and personality measures. The analysis reveals that
the two concepts are rather complementary when it comes to explaining heterogene-
ity in important life outcomes and behavior.
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1 Introduction
Both economists and personality psychologists seek to identify determinants of heterogene-
ity in behavior. Economists typically depict decision problems in a framework of utility
maximization. An individual’s utility is shaped by preferences such as risk, time, and social
preferences.1 These preferences, in combination with expectations of future events, percep-
tions, beliefs, strategic consideration, prices and constraints shape behavior. Personality
psychology, the branch of psychology studying personality and individual differences, of-
fers several frameworks describing universal traits and individual differences. Personality
traits – defined by Roberts (2009, p. 140) as “the relatively enduring patterns of thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors that reflect the tendency to respond in certain ways under certain
circumstances” – are important determinants of personality (Roberts, 2006) and affect out-
comes. There has been a long tradition in personality psychology to measure personality
traits. The Big Five or five-factor model is the most widely used taxonomy of personality
traits. It originates from the lexical hypothesis of Allport and Odbert (1936), which postu-
lates that individual differences are encoded in language (see Borghans et al. 2008). After
years of research in this tradition, psychologists have arrived at a hierarchical organization
of personality traits with five traits at the highest level. These Big Five traits, which are
commonly labeled as openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeable-
ness, and neuroticism, capture personality traits at the broadest level of abstraction. Each
Big Five trait condenses several distinct and more narrowly defined traits. It has been ar-
gued that the bulk of items that personality psychologists have used to measure personality
1In the standard expected utility framework, risk preference is captured by the curvature of the utility
function, whereas the degree of risk aversion is represented in the concavity of the utility function (e.g.
Gollier, 2001). Time preference describes how an individual trades off utility at different points in time
(Samuelson, 1937; Frederick et al., 2002). Social preferences capture the idea that an individual’s utility
does not depend only on his own material payoff, but that it is also shaped by others’ behavior and material
payoff. Social preferences include altruism (e.g. Eckel and Grossmann, 1996) and negative and positive
reciprocity (e.g. Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). Finally, trust describes an individual’s belief about others’
trustworthiness combined with a preference to take social risks (e.g. Fehr, 2009). Another important
economic preference is the preference for work versus leisure. This preference is difficult to measure in
experiments and is therefore not part of our analysis.
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can be mapped into the Big Five taxonomy (see, e.g., Costa and McCrae, 1992)).2 Another
important concept in psychology focusing on individual beliefs and perceptions is the locus
of control framework by Rotter (1966). It represents the framework of the social learning
theory of personality and refers to the extent people believe they have control over events.
An integration of the different measures and concepts used by economists and person-
ality psychologists promises much potential for amalgamating evidence about the drivers of
human behavior which accumulated disjointedly in the fields of economics and psychology
(Borghans et al., 2008). Recently, scholars have begun to integrate personality into eco-
nomic decision making (e.g., Borghans et al., 2008). Almlund et al. (2011) enrich theory by
incorporating personality traits in a standard economic framework of production, choice,
and information. Their model interprets measured personality as a “construct derived from
an economic model of preferences, constraints, and information” (Almlund et al., 2011, p.
3). However, empirical knowledge is too limited to judge how personality traits relate to
the concepts and parameters economists typically model to predict behavior.
To shed more light on the relationship between economic preferences and psychologi-
cal measures of personality we therefore study how key economic preferences, such as risk,
time and social preferences, are linked to conventional measures of personality, such as the
Big Five and locus of control. We analyze this relationship in a coherent framework using
two main approaches. The first approach focuses on assessing the magnitude of the cor-
relations between psychological and economic measurement systems in three unique data
sets. The second approach departs from the fact that both preference measures and mea-
sures of personality traits predict a wide range of important life outcomes. If these two
measurement systems are closely linked, they are expected to be substitutes in explaining
heterogeneity in behavior. If, however, preferences and personality traits capture different
aspects of behavior, the two measurement systems may have complementary predictive
power for important life outcomes. We therefore evaluate the individual as well as the joint
explanatory power of economic preferences and psychological measures of personality in
explaining health, educational and labor market outcomes.
2For a more detailed description of the research on the development of the Big Five, criticism of the
approach and alternative measurement systems see Borghans et al. (2008).
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We use three complementary datasets. First, we look at data from laboratory exper-
iments. Using a student subject pool we conducted choice experiments on key economic
preferences, namely risk taking, time discounting, altruism, trust, and positive and negative
reciprocity. We incentivized decision-making and obtained multiple behavioral measures
for each preference. We assessed the Big Five domains using the 60-item NEO-FFI (NEO
Five Factor Inventory) (Costa and McCrae, 1989) and a 15-item subset, the so-called BFI-S
(Gerlitz and Schupp, 2005). We also measured the locus of control using 10 items adapted
from Rotter (1966). Our second data set comprises very similar incentivized experimental
measures with respect to risk taking and time discounting using a representative sam-
ple of almost 1000 participants from the German population. We are therefore able to
obtain incentivized preference measures for a representative population. Personality was
assessed using the BFI-S. The third data set stems from the German Socio-Economic Panel
Study (SOEP), comprising preference and personality measures for a representative sam-
ple of more than 14.000 individuals. Preference measures were obtained using subjective
self-assessment survey items rather than incentivized experiments, and personality was
measured by using the BFI-S and the locus of control questionnaire. Using this data set
we analyze associations between important life outcomes, such as labor market success,
subjective health status or life satisfaction, and individuals’ preferences and personalities.
These three data sets allow for a comprehensive analysis. The first data set contains
very detailed personality measures in combination with multiple experimental indicators
for preferences. This student sample therefore provides a particularly accurate assessment
of potential relations between economic preferences and personality. The second data set
uses experimental measures for a limited set of preferences and a shorter version of the Big
Five but a representative sample. A comparison of results of the two data sets therefore
informs us about the generalizability of our findings from the student sample. The third
data set additionally allows us to study an even larger sample and to explore the explana-
tory power of personality and preferences for important life outcomes.
We start by analyzing data on 489 university students. We relate all five factors that
capture personality according to the Big Five taxonomy and the measure of Locus of Con-
trol to our experimental preference measures. We generally find only small correlations
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between personality traits and preferences. In particular, only 11 of the 36 correlations
in our student sample exceed 0.1 in absolute value and only one correlation exceeds 0.2
in absolute value. These eleven correlation coefficients are all significant at conventional
levels, and eight of them involve correlations between social preferences and personality
traits.
Next, we gauge whether the correlation patterns generalize to representative samples.
We first turn to the data set that contains very similar experimental measures of risk and
time preferences and survey measures of the Big Five approximately 1000 individuals, who
were sampled to be representative of the adult population living in Germany (see Dohmen
et al., 2010). The correlation structure between personality traits and risk and time pref-
erences turns out to be similar to the one we find for students, with few exceptions.
Finally, we assess whether the empirical associations between preference parameters
and personality traits are sensitive to the way in which preferences are measured. We
compare correlations between personality traits and measures of preferences derived from
the incentivized choice experiments in the student and the representative sample to cor-
relations that are constructed based on the non-incentivized subjective self-assessments in
a representative sample of 14.000 individuals from the SOEP. Our result on the pattern
of correlations between preference measures and personality measures is again largely con-
firmed.
We then turn to a different type of analysis in which we assess the power of preferences
and personality in explaining life outcomes, including health, life satisfaction, earnings, un-
employment and education. Our analysis reveals that both measurement systems have
similar explanatory power when used separately as explanatory variables. The explained
fraction of variance increases by approximately 60% when life outcomes are regressed on
both measurement systems. We therefore conclude that each measurement system cap-
tures distinct sources of the heterogeneity in life outcomes. A coherent picture emerges
from our analysis. Both approaches strongly suggest that standard measures of preferences
and personality are complementary constructs.
So far no clear picture concerning the relations between measures of personality and
economic preferences has emerged in the literature (see Almlund et al., 2011). For example,
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the study by Daly et al. (2009) suggests a negative relationship between conscientiousness
and the discount rate, but such a negative correlation is not corroborated by Dohmen et al.
(2010), who relate experimental measures of willingness to take risk and impatience to
survey measures of the Big Five in a representative sample of adults living in Germany, nor
by Anderson et al. (2011), who relate a measure of delay acceptance to four of the Big Five
domains in a sample of 1065 US trainee truckers.3 In fact, Dohmen et al. (2010) find no
significant relationship between personality traits and preference measures in a regression
framework that includes controls for IQ, gender, age, height, education, and household
income. Raw correlations between preference and personality measures, which are also
reported in Almlund et al. (2011), are weak; time preference is significantly correlated only
to agreeableness (at the 10 percent level).4 This finding is confirmed by the significant
correlation between delay acceptance and agreeableness in the truck-driver sample of An-
derson et al. (2011).
Evidence on the link between risk preferences and the Big Five domains is equally
mixed. Raw correlations between a lottery-choice measure of risk preference and personal-
ity traits in the data from Dohmen et al. (2010) indicate significant relationships between
risk preferences and openness to experience (at the 1 percent level) and agreeableness (at
the 5 percent level). Anderson et al. (2011) do not measure openness to experience. They
do not find a significant correlation for risk preference and agreeableness, but report a
weak correlation between risk preference and neuroticism (0.05 in absolute value), which
is significant at the 10 percent level. This finding is in line with the significant positive as-
sociation between risk aversion and neuroticism reported by Borghans et al. (2009). Other
researchers (e.g. Zuckerman, 1994) have related risk preferences to sensation seeking, a
facet of extraversion in the Big Five taxonomy, and found mixed evidence. Whereas Bibby
and Ferguson (2010) report a significant correlation between a measure of loss aversion and
sensation seeking (r = 0.27), Eckel and Grossmann (2002) find no evidence of an associa-
tion between risk preferences and sensation seeking.
Evidence on the link between social preferences and personality is somewhat stronger.
3The effect sizes of the correlations between preference and personality measures are all smaller than
0.1 in absolute value.
4We report this data in Table 3.
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Dohmen et al. (2008) relate survey measures of social preferences to measures of the Big
Five using data from the SOEP and find significant associations between trust, as well as
positive and negative reciprocity and personality traits. Trust is related positively to agree-
ableness and openness to experience, and negatively to conscientiousness and neuroticism;
while positive reciprocity is positively associated with all five personality factors, negative
reciprocity is related negatively to conscientiousness and extraversion, and positively to
neuroticism. A link between extraversion and behavior in the dictator game, which can be
interpreted as a measure of altruism, has been established by Ben-Ner and Kramer (2010).
This review is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our three data sets. In Sec-
tion 3 we introduce our research strategy for investigating the link between personality and
preferences. Section 4 presents evidence on the correlation between measures of personality
and measures of preferences. In addition it contains an assessment of the explanatory power
of preferences and personality in explaining important life outcomes. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Measures
In this section, we provide a description of the three complementary data sets that we
employ for our analysis. Before we present our experimental and survey measures in detail,
a few comments on identification are warranted. Economists typically try to infer pref-
erences from choices, the so-called revealed preference approach. For example, one might
surmise that a person who does not wear a safety belt an who invests in risky stocks has a
preference for taking risks. It is, however, easy to show that the same behavioral pattern is
compatible with very different risk preferences if other factors affect the person’s decisions.
For example, differences in beliefs about how risky driving without a safety-belt or investing
in stocks actually is may affect decisions equally strong than underlying risk preferences.
The problem is that the decision context is uncontrolled and person specific, rendering
precise statements about preference parameters very difficult.5 This is why economists
5Conceptually identical problems apply to the identification of traits, such as ability, physical strength
and personality characteristics from observed performance on tasks, when performance also depends on
other unobserved factors such as time, energy and attention devoted to the task. An illuminating discussion
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run experiments to infer preferences. In a typical choice experiment subjects make deci-
sions in a well-controlled decision environment. In risk experiments, for example, stakes
and probabilities are fixed and the action space is identical for every subject. Observing
subjects’ decisions in a controlled experimental environment therefore rules out many po-
tentially confounding factors, allowing a more precise identification of preferences. Even
in an experiment, however, the identification of preferences is limited (see Manski (2002)
for a thorough discussion on the identification of experimental outcomes). The same ob-
served action can reflect different risk attitudes, for example, if the experimental subjects
dispose of different wealth levels and the curvature of the utility function is not invariant to
wealth levels. Despite these limitations experiments deliver much more precise behavioral
outcomes than non-experimental observations. In strategic situations, which are relevant
for measuring trust and reciprocity, we are able to elicit not just an action but a complete
strategy. With field observations this is impossible. The relevance of eliciting a strategy
is obvious: Suppose one observes a second mover who defects in a cooperation context,
in response to a non-cooperative act of a first mover. This could reveal selfish preferences
as well as reciprocal preferences. Disentangling the two requires knowledge about what
the decision maker would have done, had the first mover cooperated. Eliciting a strategy
instead of observing only actions does exactly this. Experimental observations have the
additional advantage over survey responses that decisions have immediate monetary con-
sequences. This is of obvious importance, for example, for identifying altruism. There is a
big difference between simply stating altruistic preferences and revealing them in a costly
manner.
2.1 Experimental Data
The first data set consists of decisions from laboratory experiments among university stu-
dents. We ran a series of simple incentivized choice experiments to elicit preferences con-
cerning risk taking, discounting, positive and negative reciprocity, and trust as well as al-
truism.6 Table 1 presents an overview of the experiments and provides a short description
of the identification problem is provided in section 3 of Almlund et al. (2011).
6For a detailed description of the experimental procedures see Falk et al. (2011).
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of the elicitation methods and the obtained behavioral measures. Four important features
about our experimental design are worth noting. First, subjects took part in two very
similar experiments each for risk taking, discounting, trust and positive reciprocity. This
allows us to average over both outcomes for each subject in order to minimize measurement
error. Second, to reduce spillovers between different choices, we ran the experiments not
in one single session but in two sessions, which were scheduled one week apart.7 Third,
to reduce possible income effects with respect to outcomes within a session, we gave feed-
back about experimental outcomes only at the end of an experimental session. Fourth,
the vast majority of subjects in the experiments had never taken part in an experiment
before. This eliminates possible confounds in behavior due to previous experiences in sim-
ilar experiments. In total, 489 students from different majors from the University of Bonn
participated.8 The experiments were run at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics
at the University of Bonn (BonnEconLab). We used zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) as experi-
mental software and recruited subjects using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each session lasted
about two hours, and average earnings were 64 Euros.
7We reversed the order of the sessions for half of the subjects. Statistical tests reveal no significant
order effects.
8Out of these 489 students, 80 took part in a pretest of the study. Most of these 80 subjects had
taken part in an experiment before. The pretest did not include the experiments on altruism and negative
reciprocity.
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Table 1: Overview of the experimental measures in data set from laboratory ex-
periments amon university students
Preference Experiment Measure
Time Two lists of choices between Average switching point
an amount of money “today” over both lists of choices
and an amount of money from the early to the
“in 12 months”. delayed amount.
Risk Two lists of choices between Average switching point
a lottery and varying safe over both lists of choices
options. from the lottery to the
safe option.
Positive Second-mover behavior in two Average amount sent back
Reciprocity versions of the trust game in both trust games.
(strategy method).
Negative Investment into punishment after Amount invested into
Reciprocity unilateral defection of the opponent punishment.
in a prisoner’s dilemma
(strategy method).
Trust First mover behavior in two Average amount sent as
versions of the trust game. a first mover in both
trust games.
Altruism First mover behavior in a Size of donation.
dictator game with a charitable
organization as recipient.
2.1.1 Preference Measures
Risk Preferences To elicit risk attitudes we adapted the design from Dohmen et al.
(2010). Subjects were shown a list of binary alternatives, a lottery and a (varying) safe
option. The lottery was the same for each decision: If they chose the lottery participants
could receive either 1000 points or zero points with 50 percent probability each. The safe
option increased from row to row, starting from a value of (close to) zero, and increasing up
to a value of (close to) the maximum payoff of the lottery. To reduce measurement error
subjects participated in two risk experiments. The choice list of the second experiment
was simply a perturbed version of the first one. Perturbations were constructed such that
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a randomly drawn integer value between -5 and +5 was added to the safe option in every
choice, corresponding to perturbations of maximally 5% of the step size of the increase
in the safe option. The complete list of choices was shown to subjects on the first screen.
Each choice situation was then presented on a separate screen, where subjects entered their
respective choice. Subjects were informed that one choice in each list would be selected
randomly and paid. Subjects with monotonic preferences should choose the lottery for
lower safe options and switch to the safe option when the latter reaches or exceeds the
level of their certainty equivalent. Thus switching points inform us about individual risk
attitudes. The earlier a subject switches to the save option the less she is willing to take
risks. For our analysis we constructed a risk preference measure using the average of the
two switching points from the two experiments.9
Time Preferences To measure individuals’ time preferences we implemented a proce-
dure very similar to the one for risk attitudes. In the discounting experiments, subjects
were given two lists of choices between an earlier amount of money (“today”), which was
the same in all choices, and an increasing delayed amount of money (“in 12 months”).
In the first row, the early amount was equal to the delayed amount. Delayed amounts
increased from row to row by 2.5%. As for risk preferences subjects participated in a very
similar second discounting experiment with small perturbations of delayed amounts be-
tween +0.5 and -0.5 percentage points. One choice in each of the two lists was randomly
selected for payment. Payments resulting from the two experiments were sent to subjects
via regular mail. If a subject chose the early amount, the payment was sent out on the
day of the experimental session. If a subject chose the delayed amount, the payment was
sent out with a delay of 12 months.10 The switching point from early to delayed payment
informs us about a subject’s time preference. Subjects who switch later discount the future
amount by more (i.e., are less patient) than subjects who switch earlier.11 Our measure
9If subjects switched between the lottery and the safe option more than once, we took the average
switching row as an estimate of their certainty equivalent. This happened in 16 % of the cases in the first
experiment on risk taking, and in 11 % of the cases in the second experiment.
10Keeping the payoff mode identical over both time horizons rules out credibility concerns.
11For subjects, who switched more than once, we took the average switching row as an estimate of their
discount rate. This happened in 5 % of the cases in the first experiment on time discounting, and in 7 %
10
of individual discounting is the average switching row in both lists. To ease interpretation
of the correlations reported below, we recode the measure, such that higher values imply
earlier switching rows, i.e., a higher level of patience.
Trust We elicited trust from first-mover behavior in the so-called trust game (Berg et al.,
1995). We conducted two versions of the trust game. In one version, the amount sent
by the first mover was doubled by the experimenter, whereas in the second version the
amount was tripled. Every subject was in the role of the first and of the second mover
twice.12 Both trust games were incentivized, i.e., every (relevant) decision was paid. In
the role of a first mover, subjects could choose to send any amount in {0, 50, 100, . . . , 500}
points to the second mover. All interactions in the trust game as well as in all other social
preference experiments were one-shot and anonymous (perfect stranger matching protocol).
The average amount sent as a first mover in both trust games constitutes our experimental
measure for trust: Subjects who send higher amounts of money are those who display
higher levels of trust.
Positive Reciprocity To elicit positive reciprocal inclinations we measure subjects’
second-mover behavior in the trust game (see above). We implemented the strategy method
(Selten, 1967). This means that for every possible amount sent by the first mover, subjects
were asked to indicate how much they wanted to send back. The actual decision of the first
mover determined which of these decisions became payoff relevant. The average amount
sent back as a second mover in both trust games was taken as individuals’ willingness to
reciprocate, such that higher values imply a higher willingness to reciprocate.
Negative Reciprocity To measure subjects’ willingness to engage in costly punish-
ment of unfair behavior, we conducted a prisoner’s dilemma with a subsequent punishment
stage.13 In the punishment stage, subjects could choose to invest points in order to deduct
points from their opponent. Punishment was costly. Again, we implemented the strategy
of the cases in the second experiment.
12Overall, we therefore ran four trust games.
13The design of the experiment was adapted from Falk et al. (2005)
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method. Before taking their decisions in the first stage of the experiment (i.e., in the pris-
oner’s dilemma) subjects were asked to indicate how many points they wanted to deduct
from the other player in case he cooperated or defected, for both own cooperation and own
defection. Then they played a simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma. The outcome of the first
stage determined which choice of the second stage became payoff relevant. The chosen in-
vestment into punishment after unilateral defection of the other player served as a measure
of an individual’s willingness to reciprocate negatively.
Altruism To measure altruistic behavior we had subjects take part in a modified dic-
tator game in which the recipient was a charitable organization (adapted from Eckel and
Grossmann, 1996). Subjects were endowed with 300 points and had to decide how much
of this endowment to donate to a charitable organization.14 This decision serves as our
experimental measure of subjects’ altruistic inclination.
2.1.2 Personality Measures
Big Five As part of the study, subjects were given a paper-and-pencil survey, which
they were asked to fill out at home and return to us via mail.15 Of the 489 subjects, 319
completed the survey and sent it back to us. The survey included the NEO-FFI version
of the Big Five (Costa and McCrae, 1989). During the experimental sessions, all 489
subjects also answered a shorter version of the NEO-FFI: the BFI-S, a subset consisting of
15 items. The BFI-S has been developed by Gerlitz and Schupp (2005) and was also part
of the 2005 and 2009 waves of the SOEP. Correlations between the long version and the
short version of the Big Five differ between the five personality dimensions. The lowest
correlation is r = 0.48 for openness, and the highest is r = 0.71 for conscientiousness (all
p-values < 0.001). We constructed our Big Five measure in that we use data from the long
version whenever available, while for the remaining subjects we refer to the short version.
That way, we have measures of the Big Five domains for all 489 subjects.
14Subjects could choose a charitable organization from a list, or name one themselves.
15We also handed out stamped envelopes with the address of our research institute, in order to minimize
additional costs for returning the survey to us.
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Locus of Control The paper-and-pencil survey included 10 items that allows us to con-
struct a measure of the locus of control for the 319 individuals who filled in the survey.
These 10 items have been adapted from Rotter (1966) and they have also been implemented
in the 2005 wave of the SOEP. The personality construct of locus of control assesses how
much people believe they have control over their life outcomes, or how much their lives
are determined by forces that are outside of their control, such as luck or faith. We con-
structed the measure such that higher values represent a more internal locus of control,
i.e., the belief that the person can influence their life outcomes. Lower values represent a
more external locus of control.
2.2 Representative Experimental Data
The second data set we employ consists of experimental data for a representative sample
of the German population.16 This data set is used to assess whether the findings from the
sample of university students can be corroborated in a representative sample. Subjects’
risk and time preferences were elicited, and we again have information on participants’
personality. The data used here stem from a study conducted in 2005 and contains infor-
mation on 1012 individuals. For a detailed description of the study and its procedures see
Dohmen et al. (2010).
Preference Measures The experiments on risk and time preferences were similar to the
ones we used in the laboratory experiments. In both experiments subjects had to make
multiple decisions in a list of choices. To elicit their risk preferences we had subjects choose
between a lottery, which remained the same in all choices, and safe options, which increased
in their value. As in the experiments discussed above, the switching point informs us about
the individual’s willingness to take risks. Similarly, to elicit individuals’ time preferences we
had all participants make a number of intertemporal choices. They had to decide between
an amount “today” and a larger amount “12 months” later. The early amount remained
16The same data set is used in Dohmen et al. (2010).
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the same in all choices. The first delayed amount presented to subjects was devised to
imply a 2.5% return on the early amount assuming semi-annual compounding. In the
subsequent choices the delayed payment was gradually increased and was calculated such
that the implied rate of return rose in steps of 2.5 percentage points. Again, the switching
points from the early to the delayed option inform us about the subjects’ time preferences.
Personality Measures The five personality domains were assessed using the BFI-S (see
Section 2.1.2 for a more detailed description).
2.3 Representative Panel Data
The third data set we use stems from the SOEP, a large panel data set that is representa-
tive of the adult population living in Germany (see Schupp and Wagner (2002) and Wagner
et al. (2007) for a detailed description of the SOEP). We use information from eight waves
collected in the years between 2003 and 2009. In each of these waves more than 20,000
individuals were interviewed. The SOEP combines extensive sociodemographic information
with various measures of attitudes, preferences and psychological traits. In particular, the
SOEP includes survey items relating to all personality and preference measures that we
discuss in the previous sections.
Personality and economic preference measures were elicited several times between 2003
and 2009. To construct a measure for each individual, we use the maximum available num-
ber of observations of a given measure. If several measures of personality and preferences
are available, we take the average of the standardized measures of all years in which this
measure was elicited. The resulting average is then standardized as well. In case a partic-
ular measure was elicited only in one wave (e.g., as it is the case for patience) we just take
the standardized measure from that respective year. We restrict the sample to individuals
for whom we have information about each personality and preference measure. This results
in a sample size of 14,243 individuals.
Preference Measures As a measure for time preference we use answers to the following
survey question: “How would you describe yourself: Are you generally an impatient person,
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or someone who always shows great patience?”.17 Participants gave an answer on an 11-
point scale where zero means “very impatient” and 10 means “very patient”. This survey
question was implemented in the SOEP only in 2008. The risk preference question is
worded in the same manner: “How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is
fully prepared to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks?” Answers were given on an
11-point scale, where zero means “unwilling to take risks” and 10 means “fully prepared to
take risks”. This question was included in the 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2009 waves. The general
risk question has been studied in various papers and has been validated using incentivized
experiments in representative samples as well as through behavioral evidence in Dohmen
et al. (2011). In 2005 the SOEP contained six items to measure reciprocal inclinations,
three items each on positive and negative reciprocity. Examples for positive and negative
reciprocity are as follows: “If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it” and “If
I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the costs”.
Participants expressed how well these six statements apply to them on a seven-point Likert
scale. For a detailed description see Dohmen et al. (2009). Standard trust questions were
included in the 2003 and 2008 waves, using three sub-statements about whether “one can
trust people”, whether “in these times one can’t rely on anybody else” and whether “when
dealing with strangers it is better to be cautious”. Answers were given on a five-point scale
ranging from “totally agree” to “totally disagree”. Finally, our survey measure for altruism
is the answer to the question of how important it is for the participant “to be there for
others”. Answers were given on a four-point scale. The altruism question was asked in the
2004 and 2008 waves.
Personality Measures The 2005 and 2009 waves of the SOEP contained the BFI-S
questionnaire, developed by Gerlitz and Schupp (2005). The locus of control was elicited
in 2005 using Rotter’s (1966) locus of control scale. Both inventories were also used in our
laboratory experimental data (see Section 2.1.2 for more details on the BFI-S and the locus
of control scale).
17The behavioral validity of this question with respect to incentivized experiments is documented in
Vischer et al. (2011).
15
3 Research Strategy
To answer the question of whether measures of personality and economic preferences are
closely linked we first study the raw correlations between these measures. High correlations
would indicate some degree of substitutability. Low correlations, conversely, would suggest
that the two measurement systems are complementary concepts in explaining heterogeneity
in behavior. Whether a correlation should be interpreted as “high” or “low” is of course
always debatable. We therefore first look at statistical significance levels. Statistical sig-
nificance, however, can also be found for correlations that are low in terms of effect size
(Cohen, 1992). Following conventions in the social sciences we interpret effect sizes, i.e.,
correlations r, as rather “low” if r is between 0.1 and 0.3, as “medium” if r is between
0.3 and 0.5 and as “large” if r is larger than 0.5. Because the analysis of correlations is
restricted to linear relations, we also check for potential non-linear associations by con-
ducting non-parametric regressions. In particular, we look at kernel-weighted local linear
polynomial regressions.
We then check to see whether measures of personality and preferences are substitutes
or complements in terms of their explanatory power for life outcomes. In particular, we
conduct linear regressions and assess the explanatory power of the two concepts by report-
ing levels of adjusted R2. In these regressions, measures of personality and preferences are
included individually as well as jointly. If the two measurement systems are substitutes,
adjusted R2 in the combined regressions should not be distinctly higher than in regressions
that include only one of the two concepts. The opposite should hold for complements.
Additionally, we investigate model selection criteria in these regressions. We check for
robustness using binary and ordered choice models as well as more comprehensive specifi-
cations including square terms and cross-products of all regressors.
4 Results
In this section we discuss our main findings. To ease comparison between data sets and
measures, we standardized all experimental as well as all personality measures for the data
16
analysis.
4.1 Correlation Structure
4.1.1 Experimental Data
Table 2 displays the 36 raw correlations of the personality and economic preference mea-
sures obtained from the laboratory experiments. A first inspection of Table 2 reveals that
only 11 of these 36 correlations are statistically significant at the 5% or 1% level.18 All
correlation coefficients are smaller than 0.3 in absolute value. Hence there is no correlation
with a “medium” effect size or larger. Moreover, of the 36 correlations only 11 exceed 0.1
in absolute value and only 1 slightly exceeds 0.2.19
Table 2 also shows that among all personality factors agreeableness exhibits the high-
est and statistically most significant correlations with measures of economic preferences.
It is significantly correlated with measures for positive and negative reciprocity, trust and
altruism (all p-values < 0.01) as well as with time preference (p-value < 0.05). Correlations
with social preferences range between 0.1 and 0.3 in absolute value, indicating a small effect
size according to the classification of Cohen (1988). The high frequency of significant cor-
relations of agreeableness with social preferences is not surprising as the former is defined
as “the tendency to act in a cooperative, unselfish manner,...” (see Table A.1).
The finding of only moderate correlations between preference and personality measures
does not necessarily indicate that these constructs are weakly connected; it indicates only
that there are weak linear relations. For example, a perfect U-shaped relation between a
personality factor and a preference would result in an insignificant linear correlation. To
explore the possibility of non-linear relationships we therefore estimate kernel-weighted lo-
cal linear polynomial regressions.20 In each regression, we restrict the sample to a range of
18Five additional correlations are weakly significant, i.e., significant at the 10% significance level.
19Results qualitatively stay the same when investigating Spearman correlations instead of Pearson corre-
lations (see Table A.2 in the appendix). Moreover, when looking at a potential linear mapping, i.e., linear
regressions of either the Big Five on preferences or vice versa, R2 is always below 10%.
20We use the Epanechikov kernel and bandwidth is selected via the plugin estimator of the asymptotically
optimal constant bandwidth.
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four standard deviations around the mean of each variable to circumvent an analysis biased
by outliers. Therefore, the results are calculated using 70% to 97% of all observations. The
predicted regressions are displayed in Figure A.1. Although sometimes there are small
deviations from linearity at the boundaries, the overall picture strongly suggests a linear
relation in the vast majority of combinations.
Summarizing our analysis of the laboratory experimental data, we find that asso-
ciations between preference and personality measures are linear and that the degree of
association is rather low, suggesting a complementary relationship. We next turn to the
question of whether the correlation patterns observed in student samples can be replicated
in a sample that is representative of the adult population.
19
4.1.2 Representative Experimental Data
Table 3: Pearson correlation structure representative experimental data
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism
Time −0.0080 −0.0682 −0.0655 −0.0830∗ −0.0602
Risk 0.1356∗∗∗ −0.0720 0.0757 −0.0941∗∗ −0.0290
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All measures are
standardized.
Table 3 shows the correlations between the outcomes from the risk and time experiments
and the personality traits. As above, the measure for time is reversed so that higher values
indicate higher patience. In terms of significance the pattern is similar to the one in the
laboratory study. Only one correlation is significant at the 1%-level, one is significant at the
5%-level and one is significant at the 10%-level. In terms of effect size, only the coefficient
of the association between openness and risk preferences exceeds the 0.1 benchmark to
be classified as a small correlation (Cohen, 1988).21 Interestingly, the sign is positive, in
contrast to our laboratory data. The other two significant coefficients are even smaller.
The analysis of representative data therefore confirms that the level of association between
preference personality measures is rather small. However, we can draw this conclusion only
with respect to time and risk preferences, as we do not have experimental data on trust
and social preferences. We next analyze whether these findings also hold when looking at
all preference measures in a large representative sample.
4.1.3 Representative Panel Data
In this section, we study whether our findings from the experiments generalize to a large
representative sample using survey rather than experimental instruments for measuring
economic preferences. Table 4 shows the raw correlations between personality measures and
21Results qualitatively stay the same when investigating Spearman correlations instead of Pearson cor-
relations (see Table A.3 in the appendix).
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economic preferences using 14,243 observations from the SOEP. Given the large number of
observations it is not surprising to find a large number of significant correlation coefficients
(p-values < 0.05 for all correlation coefficients). In terms of effect size, however, only two
correlations are of “medium” size, i.e., larger than 0.3. Of the reported 36 correlations,
18 can be classified as “small”, whereas 16 correlations are even below 0.1. This confirms
the overall picture that emerged from the analysis of the two experimental data sets.22 A
closer comparison of the SOEP survey measures with our experimental measures further
reveals large similarities. As reported above, 11 correlations are significant at the 5% level
in the experimental data. Ten of these correlations have the same sign and are significant
at the 1% level using survey data. Moreover, as it is the case in the laboratory data set, the
personality trait agreeableness exhibits the highest correlations with economic preferences,
in particular social preferences. Although there are small differences in the results compared
with the experimental data set (i.e., seven of the 36 correlation coefficients show a different
sign), the general pattern emerging from the SOEP measures is consistent with our previous
findings. Of the seven correlation coefficients only two are (weakly) significant in the
experimental data set. Nevertheless, the inconsistency of signs brings into question the
conjecture that correlations are universally identical (i.e., identical irrespective of age or
other person characteristics). We return to this aspect in the final section.
We conclude this section with an analysis of potential non-linearities between our
SOEP preference and personality measures. As for the laboratory experimental data, we
perform kernel-weighted local linear polynomial regressions restricting the sample in each
regression to four standard deviations above and below the mean. The resulting subsamples
represent 92% to 97% of the observations of the main sample. The predicted functions
presented in Figure A.2 show no particular non-linearities, except for some splines at the
left ends of the considered range. Thus, analogous to the experimental data set, it is not
22Results qualitatively stay the same when investigating Spearman correlations instead of Pearson corre-
lations (see Table A.4 in the appendix). Moreover, when looking at a potential linear mapping, i.e., linear
regressions of either the Big Five on preferences or vice versa, R2 is always around 15% with the exception
of agreeableness, where R2 reaches 28%.
22
the case that systematic non-linearities bias correlation coefficients.
4.1.4 Explanatory Power for Life Outcomes
Figure 1: Adjusted R2 for Life Outcomes
Adjusted R2’s for linear regressions for life outcomes. The number of observations available varies for the
different life outcomes: subjective health (14,218), life satisfaction (14,214), gross wage (7,199), unemployed
(9,095), and years of education (13,768). Gross wage measures the gross hourly wage.
All reported correlation structures indicate that personality and preference measures
are far from perfectly substitutable. To determine whether they actually complement each
other, we now analyze their explanatory power with respect to important life outcomes.
To that end we again use data from the SOEP. In particular, we consider the following
outcomes: subjective health, life satisfaction, gross wage, being unemployed and years of
education. For each outcome we estimate linear regression models in which outcomes are
regressed on the set of economic preferences, the Big Five and the locus of control, sepa-
rately as well as jointly.23 The idea is to assess the explanatory power of each concept in
23The corresponding regressions are shown in Table A.5 in the appendix.
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isolation and in combination. This enables us to check the extent to which explanatory
power increases when combining the concepts and thus allows us to reach conclusions re-
garding the degree of their complementarity. The criterion used to compare differences in
explanatory power is adjusted R2.
All life outcomes we use come from the 2009 wave of the SOEP. Subjective health was
measured on a five-point-scale, from “very good” to “bad”. We reverse the answer scale
such that higher values indicate a better subjective health status. Life satisfaction was
elicited using the question “How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?”,
which was answered on an 11-point-scale (with higher values indicating higher life satisfac-
tion). Our measure for gross hourly wage is the gross monthly wage divided by monthly
working hours.24 Unemployment status is a binary variable equal to one if the person was
unemployed at the time of the survey and zero otherwise. The variable years of education
is created by adding up years of schooling and additional occupational training (including
university).25
Figure 1 shows adjusted R2’s for the different life outcomes. R2 values for the three
concepts – Big Five, Locus of Control and economic preferences – in isolation range from
1% to 10% and vary both between concepts and outcomes. Thus, they contribute to ex-
plaining heterogeneity in important life outcomes.26 More important in light of our research
question, however, is that the explanatory power is considerably larger when combining the
Big Five, the locus of control and economic preferences compared to using each concept
individually. Moreover, explanatory power is always maximized when all three concepts
are included in the regression, hereafter referred to as the full model. In this case, resulting
adjusted R2 values reach levels of about 6% to 18%. This clearly indicates the existence of
important complementarities among the different concepts.27
24Monthly working hours are calculated as the average weekly working hours multiplied by four.
25For each school degree and occupational training (including university) official standard graduation
times in years are used for the calculation.
26In the explanation of life outcomes such as gross wages, unemployment and years of education the
preference for work versus leisure would probably play a key role. However, no question related to this
preference was included in the survey.
27For an overview over the raw correlations between each preference and personality trait and life out-
comes see Figure A.3 and A.4 in Section ??.
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Because the question here is one of model selection, we also employ model selection
criteria (in particular the Akaike and Bayesian information criterion) to check whether the
full model is also chosen by model selection criteria. As can be seen in Table A.6 in the
appendix this is the case for all life outcomes considered, corroborating our previous results.
We perform the same analysis using binary and ordered choice models when appropriate.
Again, the full model is chosen by the model selection criteria in all cases. As another
robustness check we consider more flexible models: Along with including each predictor
linearly in our regressions we also include square terms and all possible cross-products (see
Table A.7 in the appendix). Again the full model obtains the highest adjusted R2 measures
when using ordinary-least-squares estimation and is also chosen by the information criteria
in nearly all cases.28 Results are again robust for employing binary and ordered choice
models when appropriate. Moreover, in all models considered the joint hypothesis that
all coefficients are equal to zero is always rejected at the 1% level (Tables A.6 and A.7 in
the appendix). In summary, sizeable complementarities among the different concepts are
corroborated in all robustness checks.
5 Discussion
In this review we examine the relation between economic preferences and personality using
three different data sets. We find no indication for a strong linear or a non-linear associa-
tion between the two. Thus we conclude that the two concepts cannot substitute for each
other. In fact, with regard to explaining heterogeneity in life outcomes, we find that the two
concepts play complementary roles. Our findings imply that researchers in economics and
psychology can benefit greatly from the respective disciplines when looking for potential
sources of heterogeneity in life outcomes.
The finding of a rather low association between economic preferences and psychological
measures of personality is perhaps not surprising. First, both concepts are constructed in
28Only the Bayesian information criterion chooses a model just including the locus of control when it
comes to explaining gross wage and unemployment. However, this is not surprising given the number of
regressors included and the tendency of Bayesian information criterion to choose parsimonious models.
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very different ways. Whereas preferences are rooted in utility theory, derived in terms of
specific functional forms of utility functions, the Big Five personality indicators originate
in language analysis. Second, the Big Five measure rather broad aspects of personality. In
particular, each dimension of the Big Five is by itself already an aggregation of different at-
titudes or subfacets. Thus, although our results show low associations between personality
and economic preferences, we cannot exclude the possibility that there is a stronger degree
of association between economic preferences and subfacets of the five personality traits.
The trait extraversion, for example, comprises different attitudes, such as being “relatively
outgoing, gregarious, sociable, and openly expressive” (see Table A.1), measured by 12 dif-
ferent questions in the NEO-FFI or three different questions in the BFI-S. In other words,
each personality measure is not only comprises multiple items, but more importantly cap-
tures distinct aspects of a character trait. Economic preferences, conversely, are defined
more narrowly. For example, the concept of time preferences refers to the individual’s
willingness to abstain from something in the present in order to benefit from that decision
in the future. Although this concept is applicable to different domains (e.g., to health
outcomes or financial decision making) the underlying concept remains the same and is
measured by standard incentivized experiments or survey items as employed in this study.
In this sense, our preference measures might resemble the subordinate aspects of the five
personality factors.
Third, the finding of strong complementarities between economic preferences and per-
sonality measures may simply reflect conceptual differences in the way economic and psy-
chological models are constructed. The economic model explains heterogeneity in behavior
in terms of three distinct components: preferences, beliefs and constraints, such as abili-
ties. In contrast, psychological measures such as the Big Five include notions of preferences
as well as beliefs and constraints. In other words, in our analysis we correlate economic
preferences at least partly with beliefs and constraints, which by construction should not
necessarily be correlated. A good example is conscientiousness. Being able and willing to
work hard and being organized comprises aspects of both, preferences and personal abil-
ities. Likewise, emotional instability, which is part of the neuroticism facet, is related to
personal inability rather than a preference. Even more extreme is the case of the locus
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of control, which is clearly a belief rather than a preference. This does not rule out the
possibility that the two concepts are related, for example, because an external locus of
control is conducive to the development of impatient behavior: if it does not pay off to
invest because life circumstances are predominantly determined by circumstances beyond
my control, the willingness to forgo current consumption and wait in order to earn a return
in the future makes little sense. Yet, beliefs and preferences are two distinct concepts.
The main focus of this review is the rather weak association and complementary na-
ture of economic and psychological measures of personality. We do not discuss the specific
signs of the correlations or ways to integrate personality into the economic model. Im-
portant work in this direction has been done by Almlund et al., 2011. Many signs of the
correlations reported above are consistent across the three data sets, in particular those
that are significant. For example, in all three data sets risk attitudes and extraversion are
positively correlated, and risk and neuroticism are negatively correlated. There are impor-
tant exceptions, however. In the student sample, for example, risk attitudes and openness
are negatively correlated, whereas they are positively and significantly negatively corre-
lated in the two representative data sets. These and other inconsistencies raise important
questions. One possible reason for finding different signs is the use of different elicitation
methods for economic preferences (experiments and survey responses). Another possibility
is that the reported correlations vary over the life-cycle. If traits develop with different
speed and at different points in life correlations should vary with age. This could explain
differences between a relatively young student sample and the representative samples. Not
much is known about how economic preferences develop over the life-cycle but at least for
risk attitudes there seems to be a robust and large negative age effect on willingness to
take risks (Dohmen et al., 2011). Another possibility is that preferences and personality are
generically differentially correlated between specific groups of the population (e.g., varying
by gender, age, height or education). From an evolutionary perspective the co-evolution
of traits may serve different purposes depending on specific life circumstances. It may be
“optimal” for one subgroup of the population to develop a positive correlation among par-
ticular traits, whereas for another subgroup it is adaptive to form a negative correlation.
More work needs to be done to uncover potential group-specific correlations between per-
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sonality and preferences.
The approach taken above is agnostic in the sense that we simply correlate existing
and important measurement systems as they are. We think this is an important exercise
but it can only be a first step. What is needed is the development of a comprehensive
framework that combines insights from the approaches taken by economists and psychol-
ogists to capture sources of heterogeneity in behavior. It is surprising that the Big Five
apparently misses important preferences such as attitudes towards risk and time. Similarly,
the economic model is incomplete not only with respect to important preferences, but also
with respect to heterogeneity in abilities and beliefs. In the standard economic framework,
beliefs are assumed to be endogenous to the strategic situation and formed in a rational
way. Perhaps, with the exception of interpersonal trust, beliefs are typically assumed to
follow common prior assumptions and rational updating. The role of the locus of control
in explaining fundamental life outcomes on top of preferences, however, reveals the impor-
tance of enduring and individual specific belief systems. Other examples include optimism,
pessimism, religious beliefs and ideological beliefs. The stability of belief heterogeneity
is not well understood. It probably originates in different priors inherited from parents,
self-selection into peer groups and institutions with reinforcing belief characteristics and
boundedly rational belief formation, such as selected perception, non-Bayesian updating
and ego utility (Ko¨szegi, 2006). Regardless of the precise channels that support enduring
heterogeneous beliefs, economics would largely benefit from measuring and including them
in explanations of economic outcomes. In addition, economists have started to model the
fact that preferences and beliefs are intimately related and not separable as traditionally
assumed. In fact, people often want to believe certain things, for example, in terms of being
liked by others or being better than others (overconfidence). Finally, another important
extension of the economic model would be the measurement of person-specific abilities.
Whereas IQ has become a standard individual-specific characteristic to be included in
outcome regressions, little work has acknowledged the importance of other competencies
captured by Big Five traits, for example, the role of conscientiousness for educational or
labor market outcomes.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Definitions of the Big Five Domains
Big Five Domain APA Dictionary Definition
Openness Individual differences in the tendency to be open
to new aesthetic, cultural, and intellectual experiences.
Conscientiousness The tendency to be organized, responsible, and hardworking;
located at one end of a dimension of individual differences:
conscientiousness vs. lack of direction.
Extraversion An orientation of ones interests and energies toward the
outer world of people and things rather than the inner
world of subjective experience; includes the quality of being
more outgoing, gregarious, sociable, and openly expressive.
Agreeableness The tendency to act in a cooperative, unselfish manner;
located at one end of a dimension of individual
differences: agreeableness vs. disagreeableness.
Neuroticism A chronic level of emotional instability
and proneness to psychological distress.
This table is in parts reproduced from Borghans et al. (2008).
Table A.3: Spearman correlation structure representative experimental data
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism
Time −0.0199 −0.0737 −0.0764∗ −0.0829∗ −0.0598
Risk 0.1315∗ −0.0744 0.0661 −0.0854∗ −0.0261
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. All measures are standardized.
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Figure A.1: Kernel-weighted local linear polynomial regressions using experimental data
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Figure A.2: Kernel-weighted local linear polynomial regressions using SOEP data
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Table A.5: Outcome Regressions: Representative Experimental Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Life Outcomes Subj. Health Life Satisf. Gross Wage Unemployed Years of Educ.
Openness 0.043*** 0.123*** 0.989*** -0.018*** 0.667***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.162) (0.004) (0.027)
Conscientiousn. 0.038*** 0.106*** 0.565*** -0.014*** -0.182***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.161) (0.004) (0.026)
Extraversion 0.026*** 0.134*** -1.201*** 0.006* -0.309***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.154) (0.004) (0.026)
Agreeableness 0.033*** 0.139*** -1.288*** 0.023*** -0.146***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.165) (0.004) (0.028)
Neuroticism -0.140*** -0.186*** -1.009*** 0.018*** -0.272***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.158) (0.004) (0.026)
LoC 0.105*** 0.307*** 1.899*** -0.043*** 0.421***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.145) (0.003) (0.024)
Patience 0.024*** 0.129*** -0.343** 0.001 -0.151***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.136) (0.003) (0.023)
Risk 0.131*** 0.076*** 0.415** 0.003 0.210***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.166) (0.004) (0.027)
Pos. Recip. -0.035*** 0.006 0.388*** -0.002 0.005
(0.008) (0.015) (0.140) (0.003) (0.023)
Neg. Recip. 0.064*** 0.039** -0.329** 0.006* -0.137***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.147) (0.003) (0.024)
Trust 0.122*** 0.308*** 1.763*** -0.035*** 0.587***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.145) (0.003) (0.024)
Altruism 0.070*** 0.072*** -0.780*** 0.005 0.084***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.152) (0.003) (0.025)
Constant 3.300*** 6.852*** 16.100*** 0.099*** 12.346***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.131) (0.003) (0.021)
Observations 14,218 14,214 7,199 9,095 13,768
Adj. R-squared 0.108 0.159 0.0919 0.0547 0.174
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All measures
are standardized.
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Figure A.3: Correlation Coefficients Between Preference Measures and Life Outcomes Using
SOEP Data
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Pearson correlation coefficients between preference measures and life outcomes using SOEP data. Trust
always shows the strongest association with life outcomes. More trust and a higher willingness to take
risk are always related to better life outcomes, e.g. better health and greater life satisfaction, whereas
negative reciprocity is associated with less life satisfaction and lower wages. The number of observations
available varies for the different life outcomes: subjective health (14,218), life satisfaction (14,214), gross
wage (7,199), unemployed (9,095), years of education (13,768). Gross wage measures the gross hourly wage.
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Figure A.4: Correlation Coefficients Between Personality Measures and Life Outcomes
Using SOEP Data
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Pearson correlation coefficients between personality measures and life outcomes using SOEP data. The
locus of control and neuroticism show the strongest associations with life outcomes. A more internal locus
of control is always related to better outcomes (e.g. better health or more life satisfaction), whereas a
higher degree of neuroticism is associated with lower wages or a higher probability of being unemployed.
The number of observations available varies for the different life outcomes: subjective health (14,218), life
satisfaction (14,214), gross wage (7,199), unemployed (9,095), years of education (13,768). Gross wage
measures the gross hourly wage.
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Table A.6: Linear representation of outcome regressions
Subjective Health (OLS) Subjective Health (o. probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 0.0561 0.0383 0.0688 0.0975 0.1075 0.0220 0.0145 0.0268 0.0388 0.0429
F-Test/LR-Test 170.04 567.35 176.01 140.59 143.72 834.99 550.62 1016.47 1471.22 1627.11
AIC 37833 38094 37641 37201 37043 37139 37415 36960 36515 36361
BIC 37878 38109 37694 37292 37142 37207 37453 37035 36628 36482
Life Satisfaction (OLS) Life Satisfaction (o. probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 0.0899 0.0782 0.0917 0.1342 0.1588 0.0261 0.0219 0.0256 0.0390 0.0467
F-Test/LR-Test 281.88 1206.91 240.08 201.27 224.67 1406.38 1178.16 1376.73 2098.73 2513.61
AIC 55038 55216 55012 54335 53926 52448 52668 52480 51768 51355
BIC 55083 55231 55065 54426 54024 52561 52751 52601 51926 51521
Gross Wage(OLS)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC - - - - -
adj. R2/pseudo R2 0.0361 0.0388 0.0456 0.0704 0.0919 - - - - -
F-Test/LR-Test 54.97 291.20 58.31 50.57 61.71 - - - - -
AIC 55088 55088 55042 54857 54690 - - - - -
BIC 55102 55102 55090 54940 54779 - - - - -
Unemployed (OLS) Unemployed (probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 0.0191 0.0331 0.0245 0.0375 0.0547 0.0322 0.0527 0.0412 0.0648 0.0926
F-Test/LR-Test 36.34 312.13 39.05 33.22 44.82 180.12 294.52 230.37 361.89 517.42
AIC 3067 2932 3017 2900 2738 5420 5298 5372 5250 5097
BIC 3110 2946 3067 2986 2830 5463 5312 5422 5336 5189
Years of Education (OLS) Years of Education (o. probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 0.0914 0.0525 0.1061 0.1545 0.1736 0.0209 0.0126 0.0241 0.0359 0.0415
F-Test/LR-Test 277.93 763.89 273.29 229.74 242.03 1355.80 817.10 1563.14 2329.14 2688.38
AIC 65506 66078 65282 64520 64206 63490 64021 63285 62529 62171
BIC 65551 66093 65335 64610 64304 63641 64141 63443 62724 62375
For the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) models we calculate R2, whereas for the ordinal models we calculate
pseudo R2. The joint significance of all coefficients is tested using the F-test (OLS) and the LR-test (ordinal
models). All F- and LR-tests are significant at the 1% level. With regard to the Akaike information criterion
(AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the smallest value for each outcome regression is underlined.
Note that the full model (including the Big 5, locus of control and preferences) is always chosen by both
information criteria. The number of observations available varies for the different life outcomes: subjective
health (14,218), life satisfaction (14,214), gross wage (7,199), unemployed (9,095 obs.), and years of education
(13,768). Gross wage measures the gross hourly wage.
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Table A.7: Outcome Regressions: Flexible Specification
Subjective Health (OLS) Subjective Health (o. probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 .0632 .0388 .0714 .1054 .1165 .0251 .0146 .0282 .0435 .0483
F-Test/LR-Test 48.99 288.17 41.48 22.75 21.83 952.98 555.19 1068.56 1651.38 1834.03
AIC 37740 38088 37623 37142 36977 37051 37413 36949 36467 36310
BIC 37899 38110 37834 37732 37665 37232 37458 37184 37079 37021
Life Satisfaction (OLS) Life Satisfaction (o. probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 .0948 .0783 .0948 .1397 .1659 .0278 .0219 .0273 .0422 .0505
F-Test/LR-Test 75.47 605.45 56.12 30.967 32.41 1493.78 1178.45 1470.26 2273.51 2715.76
AIC 54976 55214 54984 54311 53884 52391 52670 52428 51725 51309
BIC 55135 55237 55196 54901 54572 52617 52761 52708 52383 52065
Gross Wage(OLS)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC - - - - -
adj. R2/pseudo R2 .0382 .0387 .0527 .0797 .1039 - - - - -
F-Test/LR-Test 15.30 145.74 15.84 9.092 10.27 - - - - -
AIC 55111 55090 55009 54851 54672 - - - - -
BIC 55256 55111 55202 55388 55298 - - - - -
Unemployed (OLS) Unemployed (probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 .0212 .0385 .0291 .0463 .0705 .0357 .0539 .0498 .0852 .1166
F-Test/LR-Test 10.87 183.13 11.11 6.73 8.66 199.54 301.02 278.38 475.96 651.83
AIC 3062 2882 2995 2882 2662 5431 5294 5366 5268 5118
BIC 3211 2903 3194 3437 3309 5580 5314 5565 5823 5766
Years of Education (OLS) Years of Education (o. probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 .1043 .0525 .1200 .1771 .1982 .0243 .0126 .0281 .0433 .0497
F-Test/LR-Test 81.13 382.50 70.55 39.48 38.81 1575.60 817.25 1819.82 2808.59 3223.85
AIC 65324 66079 65087 64213 63869 63300 64023 63070 62181 61792
BIC 65482 66102 65297 64800 64554 63564 64151 63386 62874 62583
The outcome variables are regressed on the indicated personality and preference measures. The difference
with regard to the linear specification is that the model includes squares of all variables as well as all cross-
products. Cross-products are also calculated between concepts in case more than one concept is included,
e.g., in the Big 5-preferences case, we also include the cross-term neuroticicsm*risk. For the ordinary-least-
squares (OLS) models we calculate R2, whereas for the ordinal models we calculate pseudo-R2. The joint
significance of all coefficients is tested using the F-test (OLS models) and the LR-test (ordinal models). All
F- and LR-tests are significant at the 1% level. With regard to the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the smallest value for each outcome regression is underlined. Note
that the full model (including the Big 5, locus of control and preferences) is chosen by both information
criteria in nearly all cases; only for gross wage and unemployment does the BIC indicate that the model with
only LoC and LoC2 included should be used. The number of observations available varies for the different
life outcomes: subjective health (14,218), life satisfaction (14,214), gross wage (7,199), unemployed (9,095),
and years of education (13,768). Gross wage measures the gross hourly wage.
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